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Abstract
Developers attempting land assembly often face a potential holdout problem
that raises the cost of development. To minimize this extra cost, developers will
prefer land whose ownership is less dispersed. This creates a bias toward devel-
opment at the urban fringe where average lot sizes are larger, resulting in urban
sprawl. This paper examines the link between the holdout problem and urban
sprawl and discusses possible remedies.
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1The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl
1. Introduction
Urban sprawl is a term that has been used to describe a wide variety of
undesirable aspects of urban growth, including excessively large cities, overly long
commutes and traffic congestion, loss of open space, and failure to redevelop decayed
inner city properties (Brueckner, 2000).  Proper policy responses to these problems,
however, require a clear understanding of the underlying causes of sprawl.
Unfortunately, there does not exist a consensus on this issue.  The purpose of this paper is
to point out a particular form of land market failure—the holdout problem—that may
contribute to sprawl by creating an outward bias in the development process.
Like sprawl, the holdout problem has been defined in many ways. Properly
understood, it is a form of monopoly power that potentially arises in the course of land
assembly.  Once assembly begins, individual owners, knowing their land is essential to
the completion of the project, can hold out for prices in excess of their opportunity costs.
The result is that large-scale projects requiring assembly, like housing developments or
shopping centers, will tend to be underproduced.1  More importantly, developers of such
projects will have an incentive to seek land where ownership is less dispersed in order to
minimize the need for assembly in the first place.  As suggested above, this will create a
bias toward the urban fringe where average lot sizes are larger, resulting in excessive
outward development, or urban sprawl.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper to draw
the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl.
2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly surveys the
economic literature on urban sprawl as a basis for our analysis.  Section 3 defines the
holdout problem in the context of land assembly.  Section 4 develops a simple model of
land assembly to show that the cost of holdouts generally increases as ownership
becomes more dispersed.  Section 5 uses well-known results from the monocentric model
of cities to derive the spatial implications of the holdout problem—specifically, that
developers will prefer land further from the city center where lot sizes are larger and
ownership is less dispersed.  Finally, Section 6 discusses possible remedies for sprawl in
light of the analysis.
2. The Economic Literature on Urban Sprawl
The economics and planning literatures have not arrived at a generally accepted
definition of urban sprawl.  After reviewing previous efforts to define the phenomenon,
Galster, et al. (2001, p. 685) proposed the following, multi-dimensional definition:
Sprawl (n.) is a pattern of land use in [an urban area] that exhibits low levels of
some combination of eight distinct dimensions: density, continuity, concentration,
clustering, centrality, nuclearity, mixed uses, and proximity.
While possibly useful for empirical purposes, this definition does little to advance our
understanding of the underlying causes of sprawl.
Most urban economists would agree that sprawl describes some undesirable
aspects of urban growth.  However, they would quickly add that the spatial growth of
cities, reflecting a transformation of rural or agricultural land to urban uses, is not in itself
                                                                                                                                                
1When the government undertakes projects requiring assembly, like highways and airports, it can use the
power of eminent domain to overcome holdouts (Posner, 2003, p. 55).  In some cases, this power is also
extended to private developers (see the discussion in Section 6).
3a bad thing.2  If, in an efficiently operating land market, land developers outbid
agricultural users for their land, this implies that the land is more valuable in urban use
and the conversion is therefore efficient.  Expanding cities will thus tend to be a natural
consequence of an efficiently growing economy (reflecting, for example, an increasing
relative demand for manufactured goods over agricultural goods as income grows),3
reinforced by technological improvements that lower the cost of commuting.
Since some growth in cities is efficient, we will follow Brueckner (2000, p. 163)
and define urban sprawl to be the “excessive spatial growth of cities,” implying
inefficient outward growth.  Brueckner cites three possible sources of market failure that
in combination lead to excessive growth. First, the price of agricultural land does not
fully reflect its social value as open space, thus causing excessive conversion of
agricultural land to urban uses.  Second, commuters ignore the costs of congestion when
making their commuting decisions (the congestion externality), resulting in an excessive
amount of commuting and an inefficiently large commuting range.  Finally, real estate
developers do not take into account the full social cost of the required infrastructure, thus
artificially lowering development costs.  The following sections advance a fourth source
of market failure, the holdout problem, as a possible contributor to the inefficient spatial
growth of cities.
3. Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem
Large scale developments often require the assembly of land whose ownership is
dispersed.  Examples include public projects like highways and parks as well as private
                                                
2 Turnbull (2005) surveys the economic literature on urban growth.
4projects like shopping centers and residential developments.  A potential impediment to
all such projects is the holdout problem, which arises when individual owners, realizing
that they can impose substantial costs on the developer, seek prices well in excess of their
true reservation prices.  The holdout problem is therefore a form of monopoly power
(Posner, 2003, p. 55), though it has also been characterized in terms of transaction costs
(Cooter 2000, p. 289) and rent seeking (Goldberg, 1985).  In any case, it represents a
form of market failure in the urban land market.
It is important to emphasize that a true holdout problem requires assembly.  Thus,
for example, the negotiations between a buyer and seller for a single parcel, no matter
how difficult, do not constitute a holdout problem in the above sense because the seller’s
unwillingness to sell does not affect any other transactions; it simply reflects his efforts to
obtain the highest possible price.  In contrast, when assembly of multiple parcels is
necessary, recalcitrance of any single seller spills over to the negotiations with all other
sellers by raising the cost of the entire project.  The key difference is the existence of
complementarities among properties in the assembly case that are not present in the
individual transaction.
An important implication of the holdout problem is that the transaction costs of
assembly will exceed those of disassembly, creating a one-way bias in the land market
toward excessive fragmentation (Parisi, 2002; Heller, 1999).4  Further, the spatial
variation in the fragmentation of ownership in urban areas suggests a causal relationship
                                                                                                                                                
3 This shift is a consequence of the relatively high income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods
compared to food (Mills and Hamilton, 1994, pp. 434-437).
4Parisi (2002) likens this bias toward fragmentation to the Second Law of Thermodynamics in physics,
which says that in a closed physical system, the extent of disorder (entropy) will increase over time.  It is
also related to the “anti-commons problem,” which describes a situation in which multiple owners each
have the right to block a certain use of their collectively owned property (Heller, 1999).
5between the holdout problem and urban sprawl.  Specifically, because average lot sizes
decrease closer to the city center as a result of the land rent gradient, ownership becomes
more fragmented, thereby increasing the severity of the holdout problem for potential
land assemblers.  This will tend to push development outward. The next two sections
develop this argument in detail.
4. A Simple Model of the Holdout Problem
This section develops a simple model of the holdout problem to illustrate the
impact of dispersed ownership on a prospective developer’s costs.  The next section then
introduces the spatial dimension.
Consider a developer who needs to assemble n individually owned parcels to
produce a project worth V dollars in aggregate.  Suppose that each parcel is worth v to the
current owner,5 making the total value of the land in its current state of dispersed
ownership nv.  We assume that the developer also values individual parcels at v but
V > nv , (1)
reflecting the complementarities associated with assembly.  Assume that the individual
owners know (1) when negotiating with the developer.
To examine the nature of the strategic incentives facing sellers, suppose that the
developer has already purchased n−1 of the parcels and begins negotiating with the nth
owner.  If the final parcel is essential for completion of the overall project (as we
assume), then the aggregate value to the developer of the parcels assembled so far is
(n−1)v, meaning that he would be willing to pay up to V − (n−1)v for the nth parcel.
Assume that the seller is successful in obtaining this price; that is
6Pn = V − (n−1)v. (2)
It is instructive to rewrite this equation as
Pn = v + (V−nv), (3)
showing that the last seller is able to extract a price that reflects his full opportunity cost
of the parcel, v, plus the entire surplus from the overall project, V−nv.6
The problem facing the buyer, however, is potentially worse than this.  Since all
parcels are essential for completion of the project, each seller effectively becomes the
marginal seller, and thus, each can seek a price equal to that obtained by the nth seller.  If
all sellers succeed in doing this, then the total cost of the project to the developer is
nPn = n[V − (n−1)v]
       = V + (n−1)(V−nv), (4)
which clearly exceeds its value given (1).  Thus, strategic bargaining by the sellers will
potentially deter the developer from pursuing the project, even though it is a more
efficient use of the land.
The amount of the overpayment is given by the term (n−1)(V−nv) in (4),
reflecting the fact that the buyer can only pay the surplus to one seller before his costs
exceed the value of the project.  Further, if we assume that nv is invariant with respect to
n—meaning that the aggregate value of the land in a state of dispersed ownership does
not depend on the number of owners, holding the amount of land fixed7—then the
amount of overpayment in (4) is increasing linearly in n.
                                                                                                                                                
5 It is not essential that the individual parcels be of equal value to their owners.
6 Compare this to a buyer seeking n unconnected parcels, each worth v.  In that case, each seller could at
most obtain a price equal to v.
7 For example, as n increases, the size of individual parcels, and hence their value, must decrease in
proportion. As a result, V−nv is independent of n.
7This simple model captures the essence of the holdout problem, but it represents
an extreme version of the problem; in reality it will probably be less severe than this
analysis suggests.  For one thing, buyers may initially succeed in purchasing some
parcels for less than the cost implied by (2) by using “dummy buyers,” or because sellers
will be unaware of the scope of the project. And even when sellers recognize their
monopoly power, they will still have an interest in eventually selling to the developer, for
otherwise they will receive none of the surplus associated with assembly (Cohen, 1991, p.
354).  Thus, the most likely consequence of the holdout problem will be delays and
incomplete assembly (O’Flaherty, 1994; Strange, 1995).
It is nevertheless true that the holdout problem increases the cost of a given
development, and the extra costs will likely rise with the number of sellers.  It follows
that buyers seeking to minimize their costs will prefer locations where land ownership is
less dispersed, all else equal.  We introduce the spatial dimension in the next section to
show that this will bias large-scale development toward the urban fringe.
5. The Spatial Configuration of Lot Sizes and Urban Sprawl
It is a well-known implication of the standard monocentric city model that lot
sizes decrease toward the city center.  This is due to two reinforcing factors.8  First,
increasing land prices toward the city center cause housing producers to substitute capital
for land.  Thus, average lot sizes decrease, holding the quantity of housing fixed.  This is
shown in Figure 1, where the flatter cost line reflects an increase in the price of land
relative to capital (i.e., a decrease in pk/pl) nearer to the city center, resulting in a decrease
in the cost-minimizing lot size per house from l1 to l2.  Second, increasing housing prices
8toward the city center also cause the demand for housing to decrease, as reflected by the
inward shift in the isoquant in Figure 1 from h1 to h2.  This causes a further decrease in
the optimal lot size from l2 to l3.  The overall effect is therefore an unambiguous decrease
in lot size from l1 to l3, implying greater population density nearer to the city center.
It follows that the ownership of a parcel of land of a given size is more dispersed
the closer it is to the city center.  As the discussion of the holdout problem suggested, this
will tend to cause an increase in development costs toward the city center, beyond that
already embodied in the land rent gradient. To illustrate, suppose that the contemplated
development requires a parcel of land of size S.9  The total cost of this parcel to the
developer, ignoring considerations of assembly, is plS, which varies spatially as shown by
the solid line in Figure 2.  The aggregate value of the project, V, presumably also varies
spatially, reflecting the distribution of consumer demand, transportation costs, etc.  In a
competitive land market, the optimal location choices by developers will therefore
balance these benefits and costs, resulting in an equilibrium distribution of new
development that is also efficient.
Now add consideration of the strategic cost associated with the holdout problem.
Since we argued above that these costs will increase with greater dispersion, and that
dispersion increases toward the city center, then the strategic cost associated with
assembly will also increase toward the city center.  This is shown by the dashed line in
Figure 2, which reflects the total cost of a given development project as a function of
location.  The implication is that, compared to the situation without assembly, the optimal
location choices of developers will be systematically biased outward, toward the urban
                                                                                                                                                
8 See generally Henderson (1985), Chapter 1.
9 With n owners, the lot size of each owner is therefore l=S/n.
9fringe, where land ownership is more consolidated and assembly costs are therefore
minimized.  The result is a city characterized by urban sprawl.
6. Remedies
Because sprawl arises from a form of market failure, we consider several
remedies that could potentially be used to counteract the outward development bias.  The
first is one that developers will pursue on their own to the extent possible—namely, to
maintain secrecy about the nature of the project for as long as possible (Cohen, 1991, p.
359).  The most common means of doing this is to use dummy buyers acting on behalf of
the developer.  The law of undisclosed agency actually promotes this practice by
allowing buyers to conceal the identity of their principal under certain conditions (Parisi,
2002, pp. 617-619).
A second remedy is for the government to adopt policies aimed at offsetting the
bias toward fringe development.  This can be done by a combination of policies that
increase the cost of suburban development (e.g., zoning and other regulatory controls,
development taxes, and impact fees),10 while lowering the cost of inner city
redevelopment (e.g., subsidies or tax breaks for the development of brownfields and other
distressed properties).
A final approach that deals directly with the holdout problem is for the
government to use its power of eminent domain to facilitate efficient redevelopment
through urban renewal (Parisi, 2000, p. 632).  Seen in this light, urban renewal is a
                                                
10See, for example, Brueckner (1997) and McFarlane (1999). But also see Turnbull (2005), who argues that
in a dynamic context, threatened regulations, however well-intentioned, can have significant distortionary
effects on land use incentives.  For example, they can actually speed the pace of development as
landowners seek to pre-empt certain restrictions.
10
legitimate (albeit drastic) public response to a failure in the urban land market.  This may
explain why it has endured for so long, despite its many shortcomings (O’Flaherty,
1994).
  Not least of these shortcomings is that it raises serious constitutional questions
regarding the proper scope of the government’s taking power.  In particular, should a
private party ever be allowed to use (or benefit from) eminent domain when confronting a
holdout problem?  The controlling legal standard is the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, which limits the government’s power to take private property to projects
involving so-called “public uses.”11 Historically, courts have interpreted this to permit
certain private uses of eminent domain as a way of promoting economic development.12
As noted, one such use has been to allow cities, acting on behalf of private developers, to
take land for urban renewal.  Perhaps the most famous example is Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit,13 in which the Michigan Supreme Court allowed the
city of Detroit to condemn an entire neighborhood in order to provide land to General
Motors for construction of a new plant.  The court argued that the creation of jobs and
enhanced tax base satisfied the public use requirement. As a legal matter, however, the
question is far from resolved.14
                                                
11 The relevant clause reads “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”
See Merrill (1986) and Fischel (1995, pp. 71-75).
12 For example, private railroad builders in the nineteenth century were routinely granted takings power
(Fischel, 1995, p. 72).
13 304 N.W.2d 455, 410 Mich. 616 (1981).
14For example, in 2004 the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the Poletown decision in Wayne v.
Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004), arguing that economic development as a by-product of
a private enterprise’s pursuit of profit did not satisfy the public use requirement.  At the same time, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut recently allowed the private use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment
when it upheld the City of New London’s condemnation of a neighborhood in order to make way for
construction of a pharmaceutical plant.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 268 Conn. 1, 843 A.2d 500
(2004). The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear this case on appeal (2004 U.S. LEXIS 5008, 2004).
11
A better argument would simply have been for the court to recognize that the
primary economic justification for the takings power is to overcome holdouts, and that
private developers engaged in land assembly are no less susceptible to this problem than
is the government.  In this context, limited private use of takings power seems justified,
perhaps as a last resort, as a means of promoting economic development, and, in the
process, of combating urban sprawl.
12
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Figure 1.  Decrease in the cost-minimizing lot size closer to the city center.
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Figure 2.  Total development costs as a function of the distance from the city center (u).
